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BRING ON THE CHICKEN AND HOT OIL:
REVIVING THE NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE FOR CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT
LOREN JACOBSON†
INTRODUCTION
The so-called “nondelegation doctrine” posits that Congress
may not transfer its legislative power to another branch of
government, and yet Congress delegates its authority routinely
not only to the President, but to a whole host of other entities it
has created and that are located in the executive branch, including
executive branch agencies, independent agencies, commissions,
and sometimes even private parties.1 Recognizing that “in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
ability to delegate power under broad general directives,”2 the
Supreme Court of the United States has essentially created a
fiction:3 when Congress provides as part of the delegation
“intelligible principles” that in some way cabin the discretion of
the decisionmaker to whom it has delegated,4 the decisionmaker is
no longer “legislating,” but merely “executing” the law, as the
executive branch may do.5

†
Assistant Professor of Law, UNT Dallas College of Law. I am grateful to
Professor William Araiza of Brooklyn Law School and Professors Brian L. Owsley,
Antony Kolenc, and Christina Masso of UNT Dallas College of Law for their very
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989); see James M. Rice,
The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory
Authority to Private Parties and International Organizations, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 539,
545–48 (2017).
2
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
3
Posner and Vermeule call it a “metaphor.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1726–28 (2002).
4
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129, 2140 (2019) (“[D]elegation is
constitutional so long as Congress has set out an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the
delegee’s exercise of authority.”).
5
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the President has the duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 410 (1928) (holding that where a statute contains intelligible principles, the
President is “not in any real sense invest[ed] . . . with the power of legislation, because
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In the entire history of constitutional law, the Supreme Court
has only twice used the “intelligible principle” standard to
invalidate congressional delegations to the executive, and both of
those decisions came down in 1935.6 As Cass Sunstein so aptly
put it twenty years ago, the conventional nondelegation doctrine
has had “one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”7 Now,
of course, it has had 231 bad years, making it practically
moribund.8
Currently, however, advocates of a more robust nondelegation
doctrine have some hope that its rebirth may be imminent.9 In
June 2019, in Gundy v. United States—a case involving a
congressional delegation to the U.S. Attorney General—four
Supreme Court justices indicated their willingness to revisit the
nondelegation doctrine, and Justice Gorsuch penned a dissent that
set out a more robust version of the “intelligible principle”
standard than has prevailed for nearly a century.10 In a November
2019 statement associated with a denial of certiorari, Justice
Kavanaugh, who did not take part in the consideration or decision
of the Gundy case, indicated that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in
Gundy “may warrant further consideration” of the nondelegation
doctrine “in future cases.”11
Yet, in a later nondelegation case in which one of the lower
court judges practically invited the Supreme Court to revisit
nondelegation, the Court denied certiorari.12 The case, American
nothing involving the expediency or just operation of such legislation was left to the
determination of the President”).
6
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935);
Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429–30 (1935).
7
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
8
In a recent article, Professors Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley
argue that we should “[f]orget the debate whether nondelegation is dead. It was never
really alive to begin with.” Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at
the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 285 (2021). Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
have said, “Nondelegation is nothing more than a controversial theory that floated
around the margins of nineteenth-century constitutionalism—a theory that wasn’t
clearly adopted by the Supreme Court until 1892, and even then only in dictum.”
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1722.
9
Many of these advocates have been weighing in with their own versions of a
more robust nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 781–88 (2019).
10
See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing
to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that
effort”).
11
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.).
12
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 133, 133 (2020) (mem.).
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Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States, did not
involve congressional delegation to an agency, but congressional
delegation to the President.13 Specifically, President Trump,
relying upon the authority Congress delegated to the President in
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,14 imposed tariffs on steel and
aluminum.15 The American Institute for International Steel
challenged President Trump’s imposition of tariffs, arguing that
the delegation in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act did not
contain sufficiently narrow intelligible principles.16 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the authority
given to the President in the Trade Expansion Act was not an
unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority.17 The
Federal Circuit’s holding was based entirely on an earlier Supreme
Court case, Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc.,18 which held that the Trade Expansion Act “easily” fulfilled
the intelligible principle standard because the Act contained a
requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury find that
importation of certain goods threatened to impair the national
security prior to the President imposing tariffs and also allowed
the President to act only to the extent “necessary” to ensure
national security was not threatened.19
Following Algonquin, the Federal Circuit in American
Institute for International Steel determined that President
Trump’s proclamation raising steel tariffs was not made pursuant
to an unconstitutional delegation in the Trade Expansion Act.20
The Court of International Trade had held the same.21 However,
in a dubitante opinion,22 one of the three judges on the court, while
acknowledging the Court was bound by Algonquin, suggested that
13
14
15
16

See generally id.
19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988).
See Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625, 11627 (Mar. 8, 2018).
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 806 F. App’x 982, 983 (Fed. Cir.

2020).
17

Id. at 983, 991.
Id. at 983; see generally Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.
548 (1976).
19
Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 559.
20
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 806 F. App’x at 991.
21
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2019).
22
A “dubitante” opinion is one that indicates that “the judge doubted a legal point
but was unwilling to state that it was wrong.” Dubitante, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(7th ed. 1999). Lon Fuller described it as an opinion a judge enters that shows “the
judge is unhappy about some aspect of the decision rendered, but cannot quite bring
himself to record an open dissent.” LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 93 (1968).
18
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the delegation in the Trade Expansion Act was, in fact,
impermissibly broad and violative of separation of powers because
the Act contained no requirement that the President’s action
match the Secretary’s findings nor did the Secretary’s findings in
any way bind the President’s order.23 Inviting the higher courts to
revisit Algonquin and the nondelegation doctrine, Judge
Katzmann asked, “[i]f the delegation permitted by [S]ection 232,
as now revealed, does not constitute excessive delegation in
violation of the Constitution, what would?”24 And yet the Supreme
Court did not take up the invitation.25
The issue that this Article considers is not whether the
Supreme Court should wholesale revive the all-but-obsolete
nondelegation doctrine, which, even under Justice Gorsuch’s
formulation in Gundy, has the potential to limit the ability of the
modern administrative state to regulate. Rather, this Article
considers whether there is a basis to revisit and revise
nondelegation with respect only to delegations to the President.
Notably, in the modern era of presidential administration, it is
increasingly routine for presidents to use executive orders and
proclamations to govern and set policy. For example, President
Trump issued approximately 220 executive orders26 and 70
23

Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1351 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
Id. at 1352.
25
One might wonder whether, with the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and the recent appointment of Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Supreme Court would
take up the invitation. Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion in Gundy, finding
sufficient intelligible principles and refusing to revisit the nondelegation doctrine.
Justice Barrett’s views on nondelegation are not entirely clear. In a 2014 article on
Congress’s power to delegate authority to the President to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, then-Professor Barrett argued that it was improper for Congress to allocate
authority over the suspension decision to the President. Amy Coney Barrett,
Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2014). Instead, she
argued that Congress itself must determine whether the conditions exist to justify the
suspension of the writ. Id. at 253. Notably, in light of the argument I make in this
Article, Justice Barrett argued that limiting Congress’s ability to delegate authority
to the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus “provides structural protection
from executive excess.” Id. at 259. Although she argued for “a more demanding
application of the nondelegation doctrine” in the context of suspending writs of habeas
corpus, she made clear that her approach “[did] not challenge the premise of the
nondelegation doctrine.” Id. at 319.
26
See
Executive
Orders,
NAT’L
ARCHIVES:
FED.
REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders
[https://perma.cc/XW8U-3WCG] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022); see also Executive Orders,
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/
data/executive-orders [https://perma.cc/R6PM-BJ2A] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022). By
comparison, President Barack Obama issued 147 executive orders in his first four
years in office and President George W. Bush issued over 170 executive orders in his
24
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proclamations during his four-year term.27 As Professor William
Araiza noted, “[o]ne area where the current administration has
distinguished itself from its predecessors is in its unusually
aggressive use of emergency declarations to achieve policy goals in
situations that feature only tenuous claims to constituting real
emergencies . . . .”28 While at least some of President Trump’s
executive orders were found to be unconstitutional,29 what has
become apparent, if it was not already, is how much power
Congress has delegated to the President—any president—to issue
such executive orders and to make policy and rules through
proclamations. Constitutional law should not be based on the
actions of one president, but certainly the amount of power wielded
by the Executive in recent administrations,30 and taken to an
extreme during the Trump Administration, is cause for concern to
both conservative and progressive constitutional law scholars
alike.31 A revived nondelegation doctrine “may help rein in any
future administration that follows the [Trump Administration] in
its questionable emergency declarations and extravagant claims
of executive power.”32
This Article therefore examines whether there is a basis for
considering delegations to the President different from
congressional delegations to independent agencies or even
executive agencies. And, if treating delegations to the President
differently is appropriate, this Article further asks whether the
first four years in office. See Executive Orders, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FED. REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders
[https://perma.cc/VQ8Y-9L8D] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022); see also Executive Orders,
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics
/data/executive-orders [https://perma.cc/8ZST-S5GN] (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
27
Proclamations, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FED. REG, https://www.federalregister.gov/
presidential-documents/proclamations [https://perma.cc/E5NC-F26S] (last visited
Feb. 10, 2022).
28
William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even) Progressives
Could Like, 3 AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 211, 245 (2019).
29
See, e.g., City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018).
30
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2317 (2001).
31
Back in 2002, Professors Posner and Vermeule speculated that “the slippery
slope” of Congress delegating too much authority to the president “might not be bad.”
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1741–42. They argued that there was “little
reason to suppose, ex ante, that the grant would represent legislative abdication to an
engorged presidency, rather than a desirable response to contemporary social needs.”
Id. at 1742. They also argued that it made no sense to develop constitutional rules
“with a view to improbable political scenarios.” Id. at 1743. Unfortunately, it appears
that their predictions and optimism were unfounded.
32
Araiza, supra note 28, at 213.
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Court should view delegations to the President more narrowly
than the broad intelligible principle standard it has up until now
applied in analyzing all delegations.
This Article argues that congressional delegations to the
President should be viewed differently from delegations to
executive and independent agencies. First, the nature of the entity
to which Congress delegates is significant as a matter of
separation of powers. Thus, it is appropriate not only to look at
the substance of the delegation, but also at the delegee. Allowing
broad delegations to an administrative agency that is not
specifically provided for in the Constitution but is a creation of
Congress, and that is checked by the ways in which Congress and
the President both exert control over the agency, raises no
separation of powers concerns. Instead, an agency’s structure
guarantees its power is constitutionally cabined.
By contrast, allowing broad delegations to the President,
whose executive power the Constitution specifically defines, does
raise serious separation of powers concerns. The Court has
recognized these specific separation of powers concerns with
respect to delegation, making clear that at least in some contexts,
the delegee does matter. More specifically, the Court has said that
where Congress delegates authority to an entity in an area over
which the Constitution already grants that entity authority, the
delegation may be broader than usual.33 The Court has therefore
been clear that the nondelegation doctrine will and should account
for the delegee in certain situations, and that delegations to the
President, in particular, are bound up with particular separation
of powers concerns.
Moreover, the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to
ensure that a delegation contains sufficient detail to allow a court
to determine whether, in fact, the delegee has complied with the
terms of the delegation.34 Thus, when Congress has delegated
authority to an agency and the agency’s actions are challenged, a
court may review whether the delegation contains intelligible
principles, and then determine whether the agency’s actions were
rational, based on findings of fact, or constituted an abuse of
discretion.35 In these circumstances, it is the review for abuse of
discretion that does most of the work. Thus, the intelligible
principle analysis need not be rigorous. However, the Supreme
33
34
35

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772–73 (1996).
See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944).
See The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
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Court has held that delegations left to the President’s discretion
cannot be reviewed for a determination of whether they are based
on findings of fact, arbitrary or capricious, or constitute an abuse
of discretion.36 This means the only basis left for judicial review of
the President’s actions in such circumstances, besides the
nondelegation doctrine, is a narrow one based on
constitutionality—whether the President’s actions are specifically
authorized by the delegation or contradict it,37 or whether the
delegation violates the separation of powers altogether. Because
the nondelegation doctrine is a primary basis of judicial review of
the President’s actions—but not as necessary when it comes to
agency action—it makes sense to demand a more rigorous
nondelegation approach when it comes to presidential conduct
pursuant to a delegation.
This Article proceeds in Part I to describe the nondelegation
doctrine, trace its evolution, and discuss the constitutional and
separation of powers principles that underlie it. Part II considers
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in cases regarding the
President’s removal power as illustrative of an area of
administrative law in which, by comparison to the Court’s usual
approach to nondelegation, the Court will take into account not
just the substantive scope of Congress’s efforts to control another
branch, but also the nature of the entity over which it seeks to
maintain control. Part III looks at the limited conditions under
which, in the context of nondelegation, the Court has been willing
to take into account the nature of the delegee. Part IV argues that
separation of powers principles weigh in favor of a more robust
approach to the nondelegation doctrine as applied to congressional
delegations to the President, and Part V argues that other
considerations also endorse such an approach. Part VI shows that
the typical justifications for broad delegation also tend to favor
treating delegations to the President in a more rigorous fashion
than delegations to executive or independent agencies. Part VII
then reviews the Supreme Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence in
cases involving congressional delegations to the President for
principles that would make application of the nondelegation
doctrine more robust in such cases. It proposes the application of
a “heightened scrutiny” approach to the nondelegation doctrine
that requires courts to ask certain questions about the delegation.
36
See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992); Dalton v. Specter,
511 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1994).
37
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
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Part VIII shows how this “heightened scrutiny” approach would be
applied.
I. DELEGATION PRINCIPLES
Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States,”38 establishing that Congress is the only entity in the
federal government with the power and ability to legislate.39
However, the Constitution is silent on the question of whether or
to what extent legislative power may be delegated or shared.40
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, section
1 to mean that when Congress legislates, it must do so through
bicameralism and presentment.41 Thus, Congress cannot delegate
the authority to legislate to a subset of itself.42 The Court has also
held that separation of powers means that Congress cannot
delegate its legislative power to the Executive.43 This is because
Congress is the branch most suited to public and deliberative
lawmaking.44 By contrast, the Constitution vests the President
with executive power,45 and requires him to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”46 The Court has said that the
Take Care Clause means that the presidency is “[i]ll suited” to the

38

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757–58 (1996).
40
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (Articles I and II “do not purport to limit the authority of either recipient
of power to delegate authority to others.”). Because the text of the Constitution is
silent on whether and to what extent legislative power may be delegated, scholars
have relied upon original meaning, the framers’ intent, and historical practice to try
to determine whether delegation is permissible. Compare Mortenson & Bagley, supra
note 8, at 294–95 (arguing that the historical evidence makes clear that the framers
and members of the first few Congresses believed delegation was permissible) with
Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 992–93 (2018) (arguing
that members of the second Congresses did not believe Congress could delegate
legislative power).
41
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983).
42
Id. at 956–57.
43
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as
vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
constitution.”).
44
Loving, 517 U.S. at 757–58 (“Article I’s precise rules of representation, member
qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most
capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking.”).
45
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
46
Id. § 3.
39
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task of lawmaking, as the office is “designed for the prompt and
faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers . . . .”47
Nevertheless, Congress has and does often delegate authority
to the President and administrative agencies to implement laws,
engage in fact-finding, and make rules. One argument is that
Congress’s power to delegate and its ability to create
administrative agencies, which are not explicitly provided for in
the Constitution, arises out of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which allows Congress to “make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”48 The
Necessary and Proper Clause signals several important concepts
as related to delegation. First, Congress may pass laws that allow
for the “execution” of its own powers or the powers of the
branches.49 Second, although there is no explicit provision for the
establishment of agencies in the Constitution, the Necessary and
Proper Clause shows that the Framers understood that, in fact,
entities not explicitly provided for in the Constitution—
departments—would be created and exist, and that the font of
their creation would be Congress, which could do so as “necessary
and proper“ to ensure that Congress’s own powers and the powers
of the other branches could be executed.50
Regardless of whether the Necessary and Proper Clause can
be seen as an explicit basis for delegation, the Constitution
recognizes the potential existence of officers, departments, and
executive agencies in other places, intimating that the framers
understood that they would exist and have authority delegated to
them. First and foremost, the Constitution provides that the
President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”51 This provision

47

Loving, 517 U.S. at 758.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
49
See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2129–31 (2004).
50
For a different approach to the Necessary and Proper Clause as the
constitutional basis for delegation, see Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 348–51 (2002) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper
Clause cannot constitute a source of authority for delegation of legislative power since
it only allows Congress to adopt those additional means to permissible ends that are
“proper”).
51
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
48
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illustrates that the Framers clearly understood that although the
Constitution does not establish executive departments, Congress
would, and provided that the President must at least have a small
modicum of control over agencies through this reporting function.
Moreover, one of the powers of the President is to appoint “Officers
of the United States” whose appointments are not provided for in
the Constitution, “and which shall be established by Law.”52 The
Constitution thus recognizes that the Congress would establish
officers, and ostensibly the agencies or departments they would
oversee, by law, and that the President would appoint such
officers. The Constitution also gives Congress the power to vest
appointment of inferior officers in the President, the courts, or in
the “Heads of Departments.”53 The Constitution requires “all
executive and judicial Officers” to be “bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution” and prohibits any
religious test from being a requirement of qualification to “any
Office or public Trust.”54 Thus, although there is no explicit
provision for agencies in the Constitution, the Framers clearly
foresaw that they would exist. And since the first Congress, the
legislature has been delegating authority to executive agencies.55
Since soon after the founding of the nation, Congress has also
consistently delegated power to the President56 based on the
President’s authority and obligation to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”57 For example, in 1794, during the
Washington administration, Congress delegated authority to the
President to put in place port embargoes.58 As the Supreme Court
has explained:
[I]n the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it
is often desirable, if not essential, for the protection of the
interests of our people . . . to invest the president with large
discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes
relating to trade and commerce with other nations.59

Congress has found it desirable to give the President discretion in
matters outside the areas of trade and commerce as well, including
52

Id. cl. 2.
Id. cl. 2.
54
Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
55
See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 335–38.
56
See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683–87, 89 (1892) (listing
legislation delegating authority to the President).
57
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
58
Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 683–84.
59
Id. at 691.
53
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national security and immigration, among others, to allow him to
execute the law consistent with current circumstances.60
In 1892, the Court first confronted separation of powers
concerns regarding a congressional delegation to the President
with respect to tariffs in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark.61
Specifically, in that case, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, which gave
the President the authority to suspend a ban on duties on certain
specific imported goods based on a finding that U.S. exports of the
same types of goods were not being treated reciprocally by the
country of import.62 The Court noted: “That [C]ongress cannot
delegate legislative power to the [P]resident is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the [C]onstitution.”63
However, the Court also held that the delegation in the Tariff Act
did not run afoul of that principle because it did not “in any real
sense, invest the [P]resident with the power of legislation.”64 The
Court observed that the Tariff Act required the President to
suspend the ban on duties upon the ascertainment of certain
facts.65 Thus, instead of legislating, he was merely executing the
law—he was “the mere agent of the law-making department to
ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was
to take effect.”66
Thirty years later, in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, the Court again faced a constitutional challenge to a
congressional delegation of authority to the President to raise
tariffs and held that as long as Congress “lay down by legislative
act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”67 Since then, the
nondelegation doctrine has allowed delegations from Congress to
agencies and to the President as long as they are accompanied by
“intelligible principles,” on the theory that such principles
60
See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2019) (giving
the President authority to suspend certain classes of aliens if he deems their entry
“detrimental to the interests of the United States”).
61
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
62
Id. at 680.
63
Id. at 692.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 693.
66
Id.
67
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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circumscribe the discretion of the President or agency such that
when they follow those principles, they are not impermissibly
exercising the legislative power, but are merely executing the
legislative will.68
Only twice in the 230-year history of constitutional
jurisprudence has the Court found a congressional delegation
unconstitutional, and both decisions came from the same Court in
1935. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that a provision of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA)69 that authorized the President to approve
criminal codes of fair competition violated the nondelegation
doctrine.70 The relevant provision of the NIRA allowed the
President to approve and adopt codes promulgated by private
industrial associations or groups if the President found that the
associations or groups “impose no inequitable restrictions on
admission to membership therein and are truly representative”
and that the codes were not designed “to promote monopolies or to
eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate or
discriminate against them . . . .”71 In addition, the statute allowed
the President, in adopting the codes, to impose his own conditions
to protect consumers, employees, and others “in furtherance of the
public interest.”72
The Court acknowledged that in some circumstances, it would
be appropriate for Congress to delegate its authority. The Court
also noted that Congress can “lay[ ] down policies and establish[ ]
standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making
of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the
determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the
Legislature is to apply.”73 However, the Court found that the
delegation in the NIRA allowing the creation of codes of fair
competition was a bridge too far.74 The Court looked at whether
Congress had “itself established the standards of legal obligation,
thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure
to enact such standards ha[d] attempted to transfer that function
to others,”75 and concluded that the latter had occurred. First, the
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See id. at 410–11.
15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933).
295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
Id. at 521–23 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.).
Id. at 523.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 530.
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Court found that the relevant provisions in the NIRA were
exceptionally broad, allowing the President to act in whatever way
he deemed fit to rehabilitate and expand trade or industry.76 The
Court also found that the terms in the Act that were said to
circumscribe the President’s ability to act—terms such as “fair
competition”—were vague and subject to interpretation, giving the
President impermissibly wide discretion to act.77 The law allowed
the President to create agencies and task them with providing him
guidance, but did not require that he follow the agency guidance
in any way and gave him full authority to accept, modify, or reject
agency findings as he pleased.78 Under these facts, the Court held
that the delegation was unconstitutional as it constituted “a
sweeping delegation of legislative power.”79
In coming to this conclusion, the Court distinguished what it
considered the impermissible delegation in NIRA from what it
considered constitutional delegations in the Interstate Commerce
Act and Radio Act of 1927. Notably, the delegations in the
Interstate Commerce Act and the Radio Act of 1927 were both to
agencies—what the Court called “an expert body”80—not to the
President. Moreover, the delegations were narrow in scope,
mainly because the agencies’ purview was narrow in scope,81
unlike the President’s powers, which are broad. The Court also
observed that these delegations were permissible because under
both statutes, the agencies could only act in limited
circumstances—where there was notice and a hearing and the
agency’s orders were supported by findings of fact and sustained
by evidence.82 Moreover, both statutes that contained the
delegations provided standards for the agencies to help guide their
determinations.83
In a companion case to Schechter Poultry, Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, the Court found that a delegation to the President,
also in the NIRA, to prohibit the transportation in interstate

76

Id. at 537.
Id. at 533–34.
78
Id. at 539.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 540 (noting that delegation in the Radio Act of 1927 was permissible
because the standards established by Congress would be effectuated “by an
administrative body acting under statutory restrictions adapted to [a] particular
activity”).
82
Id. at 539–40.
83
Id.
77
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commerce of petroleum products produced in excess of state quotas
violated the nondelegation doctrine.84 The Court recognized the
importance of allowing Congress the ability to delegate, saying:
Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex
conditions involving a host of details with which the national
Legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never
been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to
perform its function in laying down policies and establishing
standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the
making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the
determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the
Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations
of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power
which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but
a futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity and
validity of such provisions and the wide range of administrative
authority which has been developed by means of them cannot be
allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if
our constitutional system is to be maintained.85

The Court held, however, that the “hot oil” provision in NIRA went
beyond the limits of the delegation authority because it contained
no standards at all to cabin the President’s discretion.86 The Court
explained: “As to the transportation of oil production in excess of
state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has
established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no
requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in
which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.”87
While the Court in Panama Refining suggested that the
nondelegation doctrine should not turn on whether the delegee
was the President or an executive agency,88 it nevertheless seemed
to suggest that the types of activities normally delegated to
agencies—fact-finding and agency rule-making—were more
appropriate subjects of delegation. Indeed, the decisions that the
Court discussed as being valid and distinguished at length are
those involving such delegations to executive agencies—to the
84

Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
Id. at 421.
86
Id. at 417–19, 430.
87
Id. at 430.
88
See id. at 420 (“If the Congress can make a grant of legislative authority . . . we
find nothing in the Constitution which restricts the Congress to the selection of the
President as grantee.”).
85
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Secretary of the Treasury,89 the Secretary of War,90 the Interstate
Commerce Commission,91 and the Federal Radio Commission.92
Moreover, the Court noted that part of the problem with the
relevant provision of the NIRA was that it subjected individuals to
criminal liability without requiring or providing judicial review of
any factual findings to support the conclusion of liability.93
Since Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, the Court has
not explicitly found a single congressional delegation to an agency
or to the President unconstitutional pursuant to the nondelegation
doctrine.94 In case after case, the Court has read the statute
providing the delegation to contain sufficient intelligible principles
to adequately circumscribe the delegee’s decision-making

89

See id. at 426–27 (discussing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (1 Wheat) 1 (1825)
and Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904)).
90
Id. at 427 (discussing Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907);
Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177 (1910); and Phila. Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912)).
91
Id. at 427–28 (discussing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210
U.S. 281, 287 (1908); InterMountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476, 486 (1914); Avent v.
United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130 (1924); and N.Y. Cent. Sec. Co. v. United States, 287
U.S. 12, 24–25 (1932)).
92
Id. at 428 (discussing Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266,
279, 285 (1933)).
93
Id. at 432. This issue is perhaps less rooted in nondelegation than in due process
concerns, but the two are related. In order not to run afoul of due process concerns, a
decision by the President would need to be accompanied by fact-finding to ensure that
it is not arbitrary or capricious. The lack of required fact-finding in the hot oil
provision of the NIRA was the basis for the Court finding the provision to violate the
nondelegation doctrine. See David M. Driesen, Judicial Review of Executive Orders’
Rationality, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1013, 1019–20 (2018) (examining the Supreme Court’s
discussion of the scope of review of executive orders in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan).
For more on the relationship between the nondelegation doctrine and due process, see
Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism, 37 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB.
POL’Y 931, 974–77 (2014).
94
Arguably, there is one more case in which the Court has found a delegation
unconstitutional—Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). In that case,
the Court found that Congress’s delegation to the President of the authority to strike
out certain provisions of appropriations bills violated the explicit provisions of the
Constitution because it allowed the President to veto a portion of a bill after it was
enacted, rather than vetoing an entire bill prior to enactment. Id. at 440–41. However,
both Justices Scalia and Justices Breyer saw the issue raised as a nondelegation issue.
See id. at 468–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
what was at issue in the case was “the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation”); id. at
471 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court has
interpreted the Constitution’s provisions delegating all “legislative” power to Congress
and vesting all “executive” power to the President “generously in terms of the
institutional arrangements that they permit”).
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authority to ensure the delegee is not “legislating.”95 Moreover,
the Court in Panama Refining asserted that whether the
delegation is to the President or an agency is irrelevant in the
analysis of whether the delegation is constitutional.96 Indeed, the
Court has rarely looked at the nature of the entity to which
Congress has delegated authority in determining whether the
delegation is constitutionally valid. Instead, the Court looks at the
substance and contours of the delegation to determine whether it
contains sufficient standards to circumscribe the delegee’s
decision-making.97
Nevertheless, the Court in both Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining seemed to show special suspicion with respect to
the delegations to the President in the NIRA, which it compared
unfavorably with delegations to agencies. Certainly, in other
administrative law contexts, important separation of powers
questions often are determined not just based on the scope of the
power Congress provides, or withholds, but also on the identity and
nature of the entity involved.
II. THE IDENTITY AND NATURE OF THE ENTITY MATTERS IN
OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONTEXTS, INCLUDING THE
PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL POWER
In another context having to do with the administrative state
and separation of powers—whether Congress can limit the
President’s ability to remove officers—the nature of the entity
where the officer is situated is dispositive to the decision of
whether the limitation is constitutionally valid. The Supreme
Court has held that Congress has more power to limit the
President’s ability to remove officers that require independence
from the President or exercise a quasi-judicial role; however,
Congress has no power to limit the President’s ability to remove
officers who are purely executive, meaning whose agencies or roles
are necessary to the President’s ability to fully and faithfully
execute the law.98

95

See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423–24 (1944); Am. Power &
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104–06 (1946); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531
U.S. 457, 473–76 (2001); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129–30 (2019).
96
Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935).
97
Id.
98
Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926), with Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).

2021]

BRING ON THE CHICKEN AND HOT OIL

699

The Constitution explicitly provides the President with the
power to appoint officers, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and gives Congress the power to bestow authority on the
President, the courts, and heads of departments to appoint inferior
officers.99 However, the Constitution is silent with respect to the
President’s ability to remove officers, and more specifically, the
extent to which Congress may limit the President’s removal power.
Thus, the Court has had to decide under what circumstances it is
permissible for Congress to limit the President’s removal power.
In Myers v. United States, the Court held that the Tenure in
Office Act, which, among other things, allowed the President to
remove a postmaster only with the consent of the Senate, was
unconstitutional because the inability to remove an executive
officer would “make it impossible for the President, in case of
political or other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”100 However, less than
ten years later, in Humphrey’s Executor, the Court found
constitutional a for-cause limitation that Congress had placed on
the President’s ability to remove officers of the Federal Trade
Commission.101 In distinguishing Myers, the Court noted that “[a]
postmaster is an executive officer restricted to the performance of
executive functions” who is not charged with any duty “at all
related to either the legislative or judicial power”102—he was
“merely one of the units in the executive department” and thus
subject to illimitable removal by the President.103 By contrast, the
Federal Trade Commission is “an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the
statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed . . . .”104 Thus, it cannot “be characterized as an arm or
an eye of the executive.”105 With respect to such agencies, the
Court held that Congress can “require them to act in discharge of
their duties independently of executive control” and therefore limit
the President’s ability to control them by limiting his power of
removal.106 Notably, the Court did not believe that Congress’s
ability to limit the President’s removal authority was based
99

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
Myers, 272 U.S. at 164.
101
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631–32.
102
Id. at 627.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 628.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 629.
100
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entirely on whether Congress deemed an agency “independent” or
placed it in the Executive branch.107 Indeed, the Court noted that
James Madison believed that the Comptroller of the Treasury,
which was located in the executive branch, may not have been a
position “purely of an executive nature” and thus may have been
subject to having his removal limited by Congress.108
Since Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, the Court has moved
away from categorizing the entity of the officer whose removal is
subject to limitation as “quasi-legislative” or “executive” in nature,
but the Court does look at the nature of the entity where the officer
is located and the nature of the officer’s duties to decide whether
Congress’s imposition of a limitation on removal is constitutionally
appropriate. Thus, in Wiener v. United States, the Court noted
that “the most reliable factor for drawing an inference regarding
the President’s power of removal . . . is the nature of the function
that Congress vested” in the commission where the relevant officer
is located.109 In that case, because the Court determined that the
War Claims Commission was intended to be “entirely free from the
control or coercive influence” of the Executive, it held that it was
unconstitutional for the President to remove a commissioner prior
to the end of his tenure.110 In Morrison v. Olson, the Court moved
further in this direction, looking at whether the inability to remove
an officer interfered with the President’s ability to fully and
faithfully execute the laws in accordance with the Take Care
Clause.111 Thus, although the independent counsel could be
considered “purely executive,” what mattered was that she
required independence from the President, and the President’s
inability to remove her without cause was not considered to
interfere with his duties to execute the law.112

107

See id. at 630.
Id. at 631; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 731–34 (1986) (holding that
the Comptroller General exercises an executive function and that it did not matter
that Congress considered the position to be legislative in nature); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt whether Congress
can ‘locate’ an entity within one Branch or another for constitutional purposes by
merely saying so . . . .”).
109
357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958).
110
Id. at 355–56 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629).
111
487 U.S. 654, 689–93 (1988).
112
See id. at 690–93; see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732–33 (holding that the
Comptroller General’s functions, which included the authority to issue budget reports
that specify budget reductions and to make decisions regarding which budget cuts are
to be made, are executive in nature and therefore his removal could not be controlled
by Congress).
108
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The removal cases thus establish several important
principles. First, Congress can create agencies and “require them
to . . . discharge . . . their duties independently of executive
control.”113 As then-Professor Elena Kagan pointed out, the
Court’s removal powers cases “strongly suggest that Congress may
limit the President’s capacity to direct administrative officials in
the exercise of their substantive discretion.”114 This means that
Congress can create agencies that have “a zone of independent
administration.”115 Where Congress has created such an agency,
the Court will look at the nature of that agency and the agency
officials’ duties to determine whether they require independence
and whether such independence would interfere with the
Executive’s ability to execute the laws in deciding whether it is
constitutionally permissible for Congress to limit the President’s
ability to remove such officials.116 Importantly, whether Congress
deems the agency or agent “independent” and whether the official
is part of an independent agency or an executive agency is not
entirely dispositive of the issue.117 Instead, where it is clear that
Congress has indicated that the agency or official requires
independence and such independence will not interfere with the
President’s constitutional duties, the Court has allowed Congress
more leeway to control, or at least protect, the official. Thus, the
separation of powers and checks and balances118 concerns that
underlie the removal cases suggest that Congress ought to be
113

Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629.
Kagan, supra note 30, at 2323.
115
Id. Recently, the Supreme Court has imposed an outer limit on the ability of
Congress to create such zones of independent administration, holding that an
independent agency led by a single official who is not subject to removal at will is
unconstitutional. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203–04 (2020) (holding
that “[t]he CFPB’s single-Director structure” and the Director’s “insulation from
removal,” among other unique aspects of the agency, contravene the constitutional
conception of the executive).
116
Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2245 n.3.
117
See supra note 108.
118
Different from separation of powers, the checks and balances concern looks at
whether the liberty of citizens is sufficiently protected from “tyrannical government”
by ensuring that “multiple heads of authority” are “pitted one against another in a
continuous struggle” that will deny to any of them the capacity to consolidate all
governmental authority in itself. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,
578 (1984). Indeed, underlying the Court’s decision in Seila Law seems to be not such
separation of powers concerns but the concern that the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau was so sheltered from the Executive branch that it was not subject to the
checks and balances necessary to ensure it did not consolidate too much authority to
itself. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203–04.
114
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given more deference with respect to its efforts to control “quasilegislative” agencies—agencies or officials that are considered not
to be essential to the President’s executive authority. In light of
those concerns, however, Congress’s attempts to control the
“purely executive” must be subject to closer scrutiny. In the realm
of considering whether a limitation on the President’s ability to
remove an agency official violates separation of powers, the Court
will not just look at the substance of the limitation, but also at the
nature of the official and entity whose removal is limited.119 In
these cases, the nature of the official and the entity where she is
located matter.
III. THE COURT HAS OCCASIONALLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE
NATURE OF THE DELEGEE IN NONDELEGATION CASES
Thus far, distinctions based on the nature of the agency or
entity involve that undergird the removal cases have had little
valence in nondelegation cases, except in two limited
circumstances. First, the Court has said that Congress has
broader ability to delegate authority to another entity, including
the President, where the Constitution provides that entity with
independent authority. Second, the Court has also intimated that
Congress may have more limited ability to delegate where the
delegee is not a governmental actor.
In Loving v. United States, the Court determined that a very
broad delegation allowing the President “to prescribe aggravating
factors that permit a court-martial to impose the death penalty
upon a member of the Armed [Services] convicted [for] murder”
was constitutional.120 To the Court, the two factors that mattered
most in deciding that the delegation, which had almost no
circumscribing factors, was constitutional was that the delegation
was to the President and the President has broad authority as
Commander-in-Chief.121 The Court said a delegation can be very
broad—and not subject to the normal intelligible principle
limitations—“where the entity exercising the delegated authority
itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter.”122

119

Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2197.
517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996).
121
Id. at 772.
122
Id. (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556–57 (1975)). In United
States v. Mazurie, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s delegation to local tribal
councils the authority to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages on reservations was
proper because Native American tribes typically have authority and sovereignty over
120
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Thus, because Congress delegated to the President in an area over
which the Constitution already grants him authority, the almost
limitless delegation was valid.123 However, the Court noted that
“if delegation were made to a newly created entity without
independent authority in the area,” “[p]erhaps more explicit
guidance as to how to select aggravating factors would be
necessary.”124 The Court has thus indicated that the requirement
for specificity in the intelligible principle standard can, in fact,
depend on the nature of the delegee, including the constitutional
status of the delegee.
The concept that Congress may broadly delegate depending
on the constitutional powers provided to the delegee is also the
basis of the Court’s decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright.125
That case, decided by the same Court as Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining just one year after those decisions, found
constitutional a broad delegation to the President allowing him to
suspend sales to the Chaco region of South America where he
deemed such a suspension would reestablish peace between the
countries involved in armed conflict in the region.126 Although,
arguably, the delegation was as broad and vague as the
delegations the Court had found unconstitutional in Schechter
Poultry and Panama Refining, the Court found the delegation
valid because it believed that the President had independent
authority in the area of foreign affairs.127 The Court said:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone
with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations . . . .128

In Curtiss-Wright, then, as in Loving, the Court showed a
willingness to look not just at the scope and substance of the

their members and territory. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1975). The Court stated:
“[W]hen Congress . . . delegated its authority control the introduction of alcoholic
beverages into Indian country, it did so to entities which possess a certain degree of
independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations of
tribal life.” Id. at 557.
123
Loving, 517 U.S. at 772.
124
Id.
125
299 U.S. 304, 321–22 (1936).
126
Id. at 322, 327–28.
127
Id. at 319–20.
128
Id.
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delegation, but at the nature of the delegee and his scope of
authority under the Constitution to determine whether a
delegation is valid. And it has been willing to vary the scrutiny
with which it has applied the intelligible principle test based on
the nature of the delegee.
The Court has also intimated that a delegation may be invalid
based on the nature of the entity to which Congress has delegated
power when the delegation is to a private, rather than a
government, entity. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the same Court
that decided Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining found that a
congressional delegation allowing a group of private coal
producers to set binding regulations applicable to the entire
industry was “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form”
because it was a delegation “to private persons whose interests
may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business.”129 In Yakus v. United States, the Court distinguished
Schechter Poultry by observing that part of the problem with the
delegation in that case was that the “function of formulating the
codes was delegated, not to a public official responsible to Congress
or the Executive, but to private individuals engaged in the
industries to be regulated.”130 Although the Court has not been
entirely consistent on this point,131 it has at times held that
delegations to private entities are impermissible, taking into
consideration the nature of the delegee, rather than the scope or
substance of the delegation itself. In at least some nondelegation
cases, the Court has found that both the validity and scope of the
delegation can depend on the nature of the delegee and the scope
of that delegee’s authority.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLES WEIGH IN FAVOR OF
CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE DELEGEE IN NONDELEGATION
CASES
If the Court has been willing to look at the nature of an entity
and its authority in other administrative law contexts and even,
to a limited extent, in applying the nondelegation doctrine, does it
make sense for the Court to extend this analysis? More
specifically, should the Court treat congressional delegations to
129

298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).
131
See James M. Rice, Note, The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: Preventing the
Delegation of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and International Organizations,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2017).
130
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independent agencies differently from executive agencies? Should
it treat congressional delegations to agencies in general differently
from congressional delegations to the President? I believe that
both separation of powers and checks and balances principles
weigh in favor of the latter, but not the former: the Court should
scrutinize more closely congressional delegations to the President
than it does delegations to agencies, but there are no separation of
powers or checks and balances concerns that call for delegations
to executive agencies to be treated differently from delegations to
independent agencies. In this Part, I provide separation of powers
and checks and balances justifications for a limited revival of the
nondelegation doctrine to apply to congressional delegations to the
President.132 I then discuss some practical concerns that weigh in
favor of treating congressional delegations to the President
differently from congressional delegation to agencies. I also
review the justifications for delegation and consider whether
limiting delegations to the President are supported by these
justifications. Finally, I turn back to the nondelegation cases
involving delegations to the President to see if a more robust
approach to the nondelegation doctrine can be gleaned from these
cases.
First, to understand how separation of powers and checks and
balances concerns may be different when Congress delegates to
the President from when it delegates to an agency, we must look
at the nature of delegation. Under one theory, delegation raises
no separation of powers concerns—regardless of the delegee—
because once Congress, using its legislative power, delegates
authority, the President or agency, when acting under that
delegated authority, is merely executing the law.133 James
Madison made this point when he described congressional creation
of and delegation to the agencies as follows: “The powers relative
to offices are partly Legislative and partly Executive. The
Legislature creates the office, defines the powers, limits its
132
My concern here is whether separation of powers, checks and balances, or
practical concerns should require congressional delegations to the President be
treated differently from congressional delegations to agencies. My concern is not
whether as a historical matter they have been or whether as an originalist matter,
they ought to be. Compare Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 334–38, with
Wurman, supra note 40, at 991–93.
133
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1723 (“A statutory grant of authority to
the executive isn’t a transfer of legislative power, but an exercise of legislative power.
Conversely, agents acting within the terms of such a statutory grant are exercising
executive power, not legislative power.”).
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duration, and annexes a compensation. This done, the Legislative
power ceases.”134 The Court has also occasionally described each
branch as presumptively exercising only the power
constitutionally ascribed to it. In INS v. Chadha, for example, the
majority said that when any branch acts, “it is presumptively
exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it.”135 This
means that when the Executive acts, “it presumptively acts in an
executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II.”136
While such a conception may work on an intellectual or
theoretical level, as a practical matter, it makes little sense. As
Justice White pointed out in his dissent in INS v. Chadha, the
presumption that each branch acts only in its realm is a fiction.137
He noted that, in fact, independent agencies and executive
departments engage in rulemaking and the “sheer amount of
law—the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and
direct the operation of government—made by the agencies has far
outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the
traditional process.”138
Peter Strauss noted that one
understanding of “acting legislatively” is “creating general
statements of positive law whose application to an indefinite class
awaits future acts and proceedings.”139 He has also argued:
The very purpose of delegation is to permit the delegate to create
legally binding prescriptions—that is, to act as if it were a
legislature, albeit within legislatively created substantive and
procedural constraints. Of course the agencies are lawmakers, in
any conventional sense of the term, when they engage in
rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization.140

Looked at from this perspective, it is clear that both agencies and
the President “legislate” when engaged in rulemaking or other
delegated activity. As Justice White put it, “[t]here is no question
but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or

134

See Madison in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581, 582 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
136
Id.
137
See id. at 985–86 (White, J., dissenting).
138
Id.
139
Strauss, supra note 118, at 576.
140
Id. at 636. This contrasts with Posner and Vermeule’s “naïve” view on
delegation, which posits that the authority that the President exercises pursuant to a
statutory grant is executive authority because the President is “simply executing the
statute according to its terms, and in obedience to the constitutional obligation to ‘take
Care that the laws be faithfully executed.’” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1725
(internal citation omitted).
135
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realistic sense of the term.”141 As Justice Stevens has said, “[i]t
seems clear that an executive agency’s exercise of rulemaking
authority pursuant to a valid delegation from Congress is
‘legislative.’”142
The problem, then, with delegation is that it allows a transfer
of legislative power, constitutionally only provided to Congress, to
branches of government that have not been given such power as a
constitutional matter. To cure this constitutional defect, the
nondelegation doctrine has worked thus far by engaging in
another fiction: as long as Congress has set out intelligible
principles that circumscribes agency or presidential action, such
principles curb the discretion allowed to the agency or President
and thus ensure that the agency or the President is acting to
“execute” the laws, rather than engaging in lawmaking. However,
due to concerns about judicial competency to enforce the
doctrine,143 since 1935, the courts have abandoned any rigorous
analysis under the intelligible principle test and have found every
congressional delegation meets the standard.
As I explain below, this lax approach to the intelligible
principle standard makes sense with respect to agencies—whether
executive or independent—because agencies are not products of
nor are explicitly constrained by the Constitution. The approach
makes less sense with respect to delegations to the President,
whose powers are explicitly limited by the Constitution, and whose
aggrandizement has more serious consequences from a
constitutional perspective.
The President is a creation of the Constitution and is thus
bound by the explicit terms of the document: his powers are
circumscribed by the scope of authority provided to him in Article
II and prohibited to him by Articles I and III.144 The actions of the
President are therefore especially concerning from a separation of
powers perspective because it is the defining and cabining of the
141

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986 (White, J., dissenting).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Note that Justice Gorsuch has described the delegation to the Attorney
General under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act to decide
whether pre-Act offenders come within the purview of the statute as a “blank check
to write a code of conduct governing private conduct for a half-million people,” Gundy
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), admitting that
the executive may be engaged in legislating when it acts pursuant to a congressional
delegation.
143
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7, at 321.
144
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
142
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President’s power in particular that was the Framers’ concern in
the Constitution. As Peter Strauss explains, “the separation-ofpowers idea is an essential element of the [F]ramer’s plan only” for
the President, not for executive agencies, which may have been
contemplated by the [F]ramers, but whose formation was clearly
not their concern.145 Because of the special place of the President
in the constitutional structure, expansion of his power is
particularly dangerous, in a way that the exercise of agency power
is not:
Special questions are raised when the acting body is one of the
named actors of the Constitution—Congress, President, and
Supreme Court—who occupy the apex of power and whose
excesses are for that reason the most greatly to be feared. It is
the potential powerfulness of those heads of government that
gives special meaning to the formalities of the document. For the
inferior parts of government, subject to law and the webs of
control woven by all three of the named heads, the same risks do
not arise; agency actions are of lesser concern than the
President’s for just this reason. Presidential actions are more
threatening to the stability and balance of government, to the
containment of power at its apex, than any authority given an
agency under partial control of all three named heads of
government is likely to be.146

When Congress delegates authority to the President, there is
much greater concern that it is augmenting his power in violation
of constitutional constraints and that such augmentation puts at
risk the stability of government as contemplated by the
Framers.147 Indeed, separation of powers requires the branches to
remain “radically separate” in order to keep each branch within
the constraints of law.148 When Congress delegates legislative
power to the President, this clearly violates separation of powers
because it augments or “aggrandizes” the President’s power
beyond what is contemplated in the Constitution.149 A robust
145

Strauss, supra note 118, at 635.
Id. at 635–36 (emphasis omitted).
147
See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–40 (1998) (finding the
Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because it augmented the President’s power
beyond the scope of powers provided in the Constitution).
148
Strauss, supra note 118, at 577.
149
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 114–15 (1994) (describing the Court’s distaste
for allowing “aggrandizement” of any of the branches of government provided for in
the Constitution); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–40 (finding the Line Item Veto Act
unconstitutional because it augmented the President’s power beyond the scope of
146
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version of the intelligible principle standard is therefore needed to
ensure that the delegation gives the President the power only to
execute the law, not create it, guaranteeing that the President’s
powers are not augmented beyond what is provided in the
Constitution.
By contrast, congressional delegations to an agency, whether
executive or independent, do not create such separation of powers
concerns. First, all agencies are creations of Congress; as Todd
Rakoff has observed, administrative agencies have “no obvious
Rather, what makes agencies
constitutional status.”150
constitutionally acceptable is that they are subject to the push and
pull of all three branches of government—what Peter Strauss
calls “checks and balances.”151 Checks and balances do not require
the separation of the branches, and in fact, recognize that such
separation is not practical. Instead, a checks and balances
approach looks at whether the liberty of citizens is sufficiently
protected from tyrannical government by ensuring that “multiple
heads of authority” are “pitted one against another in a continuous
struggle” that will deny to any of them the capacity to consolidate
all governmental authority in itself.152 Executive and independent
agencies generally meet this test because both Congress and the
President can exercise some form of control over them, and their
actions are subject to judicial review.153
More specifically, although Congress cannot control the
agencies by legislative veto,154 by providing for congressional
removal of agency officials,155 or by creating a truly independent
powers provided in the Constitution); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722–24 (1986)
(finding provision that allowed removal of an agency official only by a joint resolution
of Congress unconstitutional because it aggrandized Congress’s power in a way that
was inconsistent with separation of powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–58
(1983) (finding the legislative veto unconstitutional because it confers “special powers
on one House” beyond the scope of what the Constitution explicitly contemplates and
therefore augments the power of Congress beyond constitutional purview).
150
Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the American Administrative State, 11
TEL AVIV UNIV. STUD. L. 9, 22 (1992).
151
Strauss, supra note 118, at 578.
152
Id.
153
When executive agencies do not meet this test—when, for example, the Court
finds them to be too independent from the President’s control, as in Seila Law LLC v.
CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), the Court will modify the “checks and balances” to
ensure a sufficient amount of shared control over the agency as between Congress and
the President. See id. at 2211 (severing the for cause removal provision that limited
the President’s ability to remove the single-director head of an independent agency).
154
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958.
155
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986).
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agency with a unitary head whose ability to be removed is
limited,156 when Congress delegates authority to an agency official,
the President cannot override that authority. In other words, once
Congress has conferred authority on an agency head, the
President has no power to make decision within the scope of that
authority himself.157 While an agency head in an executive agency,
who can be fired at will, may be more likely to follow the
President’s directives than an officer in an independent agency,
where the President’s removal power is limited, as Richard Pildes
and Cass Sunstein have pointed out, a “discharge is highly visible
and comes with significant political costs.”158 Thus, “while the
President may discharge, he may not otherwise force decisions, at
least if Congress has allocated decisional authority to a particular
agency.”159 This means that when Congress delegates power to an
administrative agency, the implication may be that it wishes to
insulate the exercise of that power from the President.160 Even if
that is not the proper implication, what is clear is that all agencies,
whether executive or independent, are subject to some form of
congressional
control—through
delegation,
hearings,
appropriations, and sometimes through limitations on
removal161—and are also subject to Presidential direction in some
respects.162 The push and pull of both Congress and the President
on agencies, and the judiciary’s ability to review their actions,
creates a system of checks and balances that assures that there is
“no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment”163 of any
one branch.164

156

Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2201–04.
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1995); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Administrative Process in
Crisis—The Example of Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaking, 6 ADMIN. L.J.
710, 716 (1993) (stating that “the power to regulate remains where the statute places
it: the agency head ultimately is to decide what to do”); Strauss, supra note 118, at
649–50 (stating that “the agencies to which rulemaking is assigned,” rather than the
President, possess “ultimate decisional authority”).
158
Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 157, at 25.
159
Id.
160
See Kagan, supra note 30, at 2329.
161
See id. at 2257–60.
162
Strauss, supra note 118, at 583; see also Kagan, supra note 30, at 2281–82.
163
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989).
164
This was the very problem with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Because it was a single-director agency and that director was insulated by Congress
from presidential control through limits on removal, it was not subject to “multiple
heads of authority” who were “pitted one against another in a continuous struggle,”
Strauss, supra note 118, at 578, and thus sufficient checks and balances to make it
157
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All agencies are essentially the same in this regard, and thus
whether an agency is executive or independent—and the extent to
which it may be subject to presidential control—is not important
in assessing how the nondelegation doctrine should be applied to
it. As Peter Strauss has put it:
The federal agencies are placed in the structure of federal
government—as cabinet agencies, independent executive
agencies, or independent regulatory commissions—without
apparent regard for the functions they are to perform. Their
internal and public procedures do not vary with their placement.
The functions they perform belie simple classification as
‘legislative,’ ‘executive,’ or ‘judicial,’ but partake of all three
characteristics.165

Thus, what matters is not what an agency is called, or where
Congress decides to locate it, or even the extent to which the
President can control it. What matters is that all agencies are
subject to some form of checks and balances, and thus
congressional delegations to them do not raise separation of
powers concerns.
Indeed, because all agencies partake of the three
characteristics of government and are subject to the push and pull
of the three branches, although to different degrees and in
different ways, congressional delegations of authority to them do
not raise constitutional concerns. Within agencies, it is their very
structure that assures their constitutionality. As long as an
agency is subject to some form of control by more than one branch
of government, it remains constitutionally sound.166 The scope of
Congress’s delegation to an agency has no bearing on this concern,
because it does not matter if an agency engages in legislation, so
long as it is, in some respect, subject also to the President’s
authority.167 Thus, the analysis of whether Congress has provided
an intelligible principle to guide agency decision-making matters
not because such cabining of the agency’s power converts its
activities to executive action, but because Congress’s provision of
an intelligible principle permits the agency to be subject to the
third branch of government—the judiciary. In other words, the
constitutionally permissible. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203–04
(2020) (holding that “[t]he CFPB’s single-Director structure” and the Director’s
“insulation from removal,” among other unique aspects of the agency, contravene the
constitutional conception of the executive).
165
Strauss, supra note 118, at 583.
166
See id. at 579–80; Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2202–04.
167
See Strauss, supra note 118, at 597.
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provision of an intelligible principle matters because it allows a
court “to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed.”168 In this context, a court’s only concern when reviewing
whether Congress has provided an intelligible principle when
delegating authority to an agency is determining whether those
principles exist.169 The current lax approach to the intelligible
principle analysis does just this and is therefore constitutionally
sufficient when applied to congressional delegations to agencies.
Another way to conceptualize the difference between agencies
and the President with respect to delegations is through the
analytical lens that Todd Rakoff has described. Professor Rakoff
has argued that the Court has not found administrative agencies
to be constitutionally circumspect even when they are
“omnipowered,” meaning that they may have two or more powers
of the three branches of government, as long as they are also
“unicompetent,” meaning that they are entitled to exercise their
many powers “over only a small terrain.”170 By comparison, the
President’s authority is proper when it is “unipowered”—having
only the power pursuant to the Constitution to execute the law—
but not “omnicompetent.”171 Professor Rakoff has argued that one
way to understand the Court’s rejection of the delegations to the
President in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining is due to the
breadth of delegated authority that existed in the National
Industrial Recovery Act: it delegated to the President
“[o]mnicompetence.”172 Chief Justice Hughes noted this in his
opinion, describing the delegated authority as “extending the
President’s discretion to all the varieties of laws which he may
deem to be beneficial in dealing with the vast array of commercial
and industrial activities throughout the country.”173
I would argue that it is was not just a concern about
omnicompetence that motivated the two 1935 decisions. After all,
the President already has omnicompetence—his powers include
not just the requirement to execute the law, but to act as
Commander-in-Chief and to appoint officials, among others.174
The real concern was that the delegations gave the President

168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944).
See id.
Rakoff, supra note 150, at 22.
Id. at 22–24.
Id.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935).
U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2.
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omnicompetence and omnipower.175
In other words, the
delegations not only gave the President authority over many areas
of activity, but augmented his authority to include the power to
legislate, making him omnicompetent and omnipowered. In this
regard, almost every delegation to the President raises
constitutional concerns, because it runs the risk of adding
omnipower to his omnicompetence.176 By contrast, congressional
delegations to agencies do not raise such concerns, because while
they may provide omnipower to the agency—a characteristic
agencies already have—they generally do not provide the agency
with power outside their realm of authority, and thus do not make
the agency omnicompetent.177 Thus, a congressional delegation
almost never runs the risk of making an agency both omnipowered
and omnicompetent, while a congressional delegation to the
President almost always does. Indeed, the Court seemed to imply
as much in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, finding the
delegations in the NIRA to the President unconstitutionally broad,
while describing favorably delegations to “expert bod[ies],” the
agencies.178
As then-Professor Elena Kagan pointed out “[t]he Supreme
Court has applied the [nondelegation] doctrine only when
Congress has delegated power directly to the President—never
when Congress has delegated power to agency officials.”179 The
nondelegation doctrine as applied thus expresses some justified
“special suspicion of the President as a policymaker.”180 Based on
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, and on separation of
powers concerns, it makes sense for delegations to the President
to be scrutinized more carefully than delegations to agencies to
ensure that the power given to the President is indeed only
executive and does not aggrandize his authority. The President
can remain omnicompetent, but his omnipower must be cabined.

175

See Rakoff, supra note 150, at 22.
The exception to this, of course, are delegations to the President involving a
power that has already been constitutionally committed to him. See Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996).
177
Rakoff, supra note 150, at 22.
178
See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539; Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 431–32 (1935).
179
Kagan, supra note 30, at 2364.
180
Id. at 2365.
176
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V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ALSO WEIGH IN FAVOR OF
SUBJECTING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT
TO MORE SCRUTINY THAN DELEGATIONS TO AGENCIES
This “special suspicion” of congressional delegations to the
President as policymaker is justified not only based on the
separation of powers concerns set out above, but also based on
practical concerns. First, agencies have the power to limit their
authority through rulemaking, which the President does not,
making the necessity of subjecting agencies to a more robust
nondelegation doctrine less essential.181
Second, agencies’
decision-making is subject to judicial review if arbitrary and
capricious, while the President’s decision-making can only be
subject to judicial review based on constitutionality.182 While the
nondelegation doctrine, other constitutional concerns, and the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provide a vehicle for
subjecting agency decision-making to judicial review, the
nondelegation doctrine is the only viable basis for challenging
presidential policymaking unless the policy violates separation of
powers under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.183
Both of these points were made by Justice Breyer in his
dissent in Clinton v. City of New York. In considering whether the
delegation to the President in the Line Item Veto Act was
constitutional, Justice Breyer pointed out that “there are
important differences between the delegation [of authority to the
President to cancel an appropriation line] and other broad,
constitutionally acceptable delegations to Executive Branch
agencies . . . .”184 First, Justice Breyer explained that “a broad
delegation of authority to an administrative agency differs from [a
delegation to the President] in that agencies often develop
subsidiary rules under the statute, rules that explain the general
‘public interest’ language.”185 Although the Court has held that an
agency may not cure an unlawful delegation by adopting rules to

181

But see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992).
183
See generally 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
184
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 489 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Kagan, supra note 30, at 2367 (noting that
Justice Breyer has argued that there are “several reasons for holding delegations to
the President to a stricter standard than delegations to administrative agencies”).
185
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 489 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182
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limit the construction of the statute,186 the fact that agencies do
develop subsidiary rules “diminishes the risk that the agency will
use the breadth of a grant of authority as a cloak for unreasonable
or unfair implementation.”187 The President, by contrast, does not
narrow his discretionary power through rulemaking.188 Thus, it
makes sense for the nondelegation doctrine to be more robust as
applied to delegations to the President.
Perhaps more important, “agencies are typically subject to
judicial review, which review provides an additional check against
arbitrary implementation.”189 The President’s implementation of
a congressional delegation, however, is not subject to judicial
review under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act.190
Thus, it may be appropriate to strengthen the heft of the
nondelegation doctrine to ensure presidential fidelity to
congressional intent and thereby ensure the President has not
impermissibly encroached on the legislative realm.191
The APA provides for judicial review of “final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”192 It
allows a court to set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
that a court finds to be:
[A]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; . . . contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity; . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; . . . without
observance of procedure required by law; . . . unsupported by
substantial evidence . . . ; or unwarranted by the facts to the
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing
court.193

However, in Franklin v. Massachusetts, the Court held that
because the APA only explicitly applies to “agencies,” it does not
186

Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 489 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188
Id. at 490.
189
Id. at 489.
190
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
191
Of course, another solution to this problem would be to amend the
Administrative Procedure Act to have the provisions of that statute apply to
presidential actions. But thus far, Congress does not seem inclined to do so, and as far
as I can tell, no one is calling for such changes to the law. Further, amendment of the
Administrative Procedure Act to allow for abuse of discretion review of presidential
action may alleviate one concern that animates my suggestion for a more rigorous
nondelegation approach to presidential delegations, but it would not ameliorate the
separation of powers concerns raised in Part IV.
192
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966).
193
Id. § 706(2).
187
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apply to the President.194 The Court therefore found that
“[a]lthough the President’s actions may still be reviewed for
constitutionality, . . . they are not reviewable for abuse of
discretion under the APA.”195 In indicating that the President’s
actions could be reviewed for constitutionality, the Court cited to
two cases: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer196 and Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan.197 In other words, there are two primary
means for challenging the President’s actions pursuant to a
congressional delegation. First, the President’s actions could be
challenged based on the nondelegation doctrine. The other
primary available means would be to challenge the President’s
actions based on a separation of powers argument that would
consider whether the President’s actions contravene the authority
delegated to him or otherwise usurp another branch’s power.198
However, the ability to challenge the President’s authority is quite
narrow and not available with respect to every presidential action
taken pursuant to a delegation: there would actually have to be a
basis to argue that the President’s actions contravene
congressional intent or otherwise violate separation of powers.
Merely arguing that the President’s actions are in excess of, rather
194

Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800–01.
Id. at 801.
196
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
197
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
198
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–89 (1952). Ostensibly, a concern about a
particular delegation could also be addressed through the vagueness doctrine as well.
Justice Gorsuch recognized this in his dissent in Gundy. He noted that, like the
nondelegation doctrine, the Court’s doctrine prohibiting vague laws is “an outgrowth
and ‘corollary of the separation of powers.’ ” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204,
1212 (2019)); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1226–28 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). He also observed that the use of the
vagueness doctrine has grown since the Court began to relax its approach to the
nondelegation doctrine. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142. Gorsuch argued, in part, that
rather than shift the responsibility of ensuring separation of powers to different
doctrines, the Court should revitalize the nondelegation doctrine to do that work. Id.
at 2141 (“[T]he Court has hardly abandoned the business of policing improper
legislative delegations. When one legal doctrine becomes unavailable to do its
intended work, the hydraulic pressures of our constitutional system sometimes shift
the responsibility to different doctrines. And that’s exactly what’s happened here.”);
see also Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1248 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[P]erhaps the vagueness
doctrine is really a way to enforce the separation of powers—specifically, the doctrine
of nondelegation.”). Rather than have the work done by the vagueness doctrine—
which although concerned with separation of powers, is mainly based on due process
concerns—it makes sense to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine, which is firmly
based on separation of powers concerns, when reviewing the constitutionality of
congressional delegations to the President. See id. at 1212 (majority opinion).
195
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than contrary to, his statutory authority is not enough.199 To the
extent that the President’s actions may be arbitrary or capricious
or unsupported by factual evidence, his actions cannot be
challenged and judicially reviewed.200 Moreover, even where the
President’s actions are based on fact-finding by an executive or
administrative agency, if the final decision made pursuant to the
delegation is the President’s, the executive agency fact-finding is
not subject to review under the APA.201
The unavailability of judicial review of presidential factfinding raises troubling separation of powers questions. In his
article on presidential fact-finding, Shalev Roisman argues that
requiring the President to engage in honest, reasonable inquiry in
conducting fact-finding is necessary to ensure separation of
powers.202 He argues that because the President executes the law,
if the law requires the President to find particular facts in order to
exercise a power, the President must be honest in engaging in factfinding because otherwise, “it is hard to see how [the President] is
executing the law, rather than operating on her own notions of
when power ought to be exercised.”203 Yet, as the law currently
stands, there is no basis for a court to review whether, in fact, the
President has engaged in honest, reasonable fact-finding and
therefore has impermissibly encroached into the realm of
legislating.
This was part of what Judge Katzmann identified as the
problem in his dubitante opinion in American Institute for
International Steel, Inc. v. United States. In that case, the
President’s decision to raise steel tariffs by 10% and 25% was
based on a report by the Secretary of Commerce, finding that steel
was being imported into the country in such quantities as to
“threaten to impair the national security.”204 As Judge Katzmann
noted, this finding could not be scrutinized, even though the record
revealed that the Secretary of Defense had noted that “the U.S.
199

Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1994).
Id. at 469.
201
Id. at 469–70.
202
Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 857 (2019).
203
Id. at 858 (emphasis omitted).
204
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1338 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2019) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A)); see also U.S. DEP’T OF COM.
BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC. OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF
STEEL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION
232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_
national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180111.pdf [https://perma.cc/82AT-HF3K].
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military requirements for steel and aluminum each only represent
about three percent of U.S. production.”205 Neither could the
President’s ultimate decision raising tariffs, which provided “no
rationale for how a tariff of 25% was derived in some situations,
and 10% in others.”206 The Court’s prohibition of review of
delegations left to the President’s discretion pursuant to the APA
thus meant that with respect to the Trade Expansion Act
“identifying the line between regulation of trade in furtherance of
national security and an impermissible encroachment into the role
of Congress” was elusive “because judicial review would allow
neither an inquiry into the President’s motives nor a review of his
[or the Secretary of Commerce’s] fact-finding.”207 In other words,
since the only restraint on the delegation in that case was that the
President had to base his decisions on the Secretary of the
Treasury’s finding that the national security was threatened, that
discretion was unbounded because the court could not review or
test whether, in fact, there were sufficient facts supporting the
finding that the national security was indeed threatened.
The case illustrates why a more robust version of the
nondelegation doctrine is required with respect to congressional
delegations to the President. Because of the limited nature of
review to which such delegations are subjected, to ensure that the
President’s actions are actually circumscribed by fact-finding, and
that he is not engaging in legislation, when the nondelegation
doctrine is applied in these circumstances, it must actually have
some teeth.208 Or, as Justice Breyer has put it, “given the difficulty
of controlling the exercise of discretion delegated to the
President[,] rule of law values may counsel extra hesitation in
allowing the delegation in the first instance.”209 Because the
President’s actions are not subject to any review for arbitrariness
or capriciousness, to ensure separation of powers and protect
individual liberty and concern for the rule of law, the Court should
more carefully scrutinize delegations to the President for indicia
that there are elements of the delegation that restrain the
President’s actions.
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Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1351 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
Id.
207
Id. at 1344–45 (majority opinion).
208
Despite the focus on presidential fact-finding with respect to trade policy in
this Article, in fact, delegations to the President that in some way are supposed to be
informed by fact finding are pervasive. See Roisman, supra note 202, at 837–45.
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Kagan, supra note 30, at 2369.
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In addition, because presidential action cannot be reviewed
for abuse of discretion, the nondelegation doctrine must do more
work in assisting courts in ensuring that the President is actually
following the will of Congress. The Supreme Court has said that
one purpose of requiring Congress to include “intelligible
principles“ in its delegations is to permit a court “to ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.”210 Posner and
Vermeule have argued that the nondelegation doctrine thus begs
the relevant question.211 According to their thinking, instead of
engaging in a nondelegation analysis, the legal question for
judicial review should simply be “whether the agent . . . complied
with the terms of the statutory grant.”212 However, pursuant to
Franklin and Dalton, courts cannot review delegations left to the
President’s discretion for rationality, findings of fact, or abuse of
discretion.213 Thus, to a certain extent, courts are prohibited from
reviewing whether the President in particular has “complied with
the terms of the statutory grant.”214 In such circumstances, even
under Posner and Vermeule’s theory, the nondelegation doctrine
should exist—and arguably be more rigorous—to allow courts to
ensure that Congress has sufficiently circumscribed the
President’s discretion and that the President is not acting outside
the scope of his authority.
Justice Marshall once noted that “judicial review perfects a
delegated-lawmaking scheme by assuring that the exercise of such
power remains within statutory bounds.”215 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has consistently made clear that the availability of judicial
review of administrative action is an essential predicate to
upholding broad delegations of congressional power.216 This is
because it is the availability of judicial review that guarantees
executive compliance with congressional will, thereby ensuring
210
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944); see also Indus. Union
Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(stating that the “intelligible principle” test “ensures that courts charged with
reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test that
exercise against ascertainable standards”).
211
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1731.
212
Id. at 1732.
213
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992); Dalton v. Specter, 511
U.S. 462, 474 (1994).
214
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1732.
215
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring).
216
See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218–19 (1989); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16
(1983); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 436; Touby, 500 U.S. at 170 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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that the executive branch is limited to enforcing the law, rather
than making it.217 As one jurist has put it, “Congress has been
willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly and the courts
have upheld such delegation because there is court review to
assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within
statutory limits.”218 However, without judicial review—or with
only limited judicial review—broad delegations are especially
dangerous. Thus, because judicial review of the President’s
substantive decision-making is limited, the scope of Congress’s
permissible delegation to the President should also be more
limited, and the nondelegation doctrine therefore must be more
robust to ensure that Congress does its duty to sufficiently
circumscribe the President’s discretion.
VI. POLICY ARGUMENTS ALSO WEIGH IN FAVOR OF HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY FOR CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT
Although Justice Breyer raised special concerns with respect
to congressional delegations to the President in Clinton v. City of
New York, he ultimately dismissed those concerns because the
President is politically accountable to the people.219 Indeed, the
fact that the President is an elected official who is responsible to
the voters, while administrative agencies are not politically
accountable, seems to suggest that delegations to the President
should be seen more favorably, not less favorably, than delegations
to agencies. Justice Scalia made this argument in his dissent in
Mistretta v. United States.220 He argued that although delegations
to other branches of government are problematic, at least a
delegation to the President ensures that the actor is politically
accountable.221 By contrast, when Congress delegates to an agency
or commission that is not one of the other branches but is a pure
creation
of
Congress,
this
is
“an
undemocratic
precedent . . . because its recipient is not one of the three Branches
of Government.”222
217

See Touby, 500 U.S. at 168–69.
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring).
219
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 490 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Court must take into account the
Constitution’s delegation of “[e]xecutive power” to a “President” when applying the
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine to questions of Presidential authority).
220
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221
Id.
222
Id. at 422.
218
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While it is true that the President is more politically
accountable than agencies, the notion that agencies are not
accountable, or that Congress would not be held accountable for a
broad delegation to an agency may not be entirely accurate. Cass
Sunstein has pointed out, for example, that Congress may face
electoral pressure by virtue of delegating broad authority to the
agencies.223 If Congress has been seen to “pass[ ] the buck,” it may
face retribution at the polls.224 Likewise, if a politician is seen to
have failed at sanctioning an agency that makes bad policy, he or
she may be voted out of office.225 Thus, while it is true that the
President is accountable to voters while agencies are not, it is less
clear whether the voting public would punish the President, and
not Congress, when the President acts pursuant to a broad
delegation provided by Congress. Thus, the value of accountability
in informing whether delegations to the President should be
treated differently from delegations to agency is somewhat
nebulous.
Other arguments made in favor of broad delegation are based
on attributes that also are either neutral as between delegations
to agencies and to the President or support a more rigorous
approach to the nondelegation doctrine as applied to delegations
to the President as opposed to agencies. One of the most cited
justifications for allowing broad delegations to agencies—and thus
a lax approach to the intelligible principle standard—is scale. The
argument is that because Congress is purposefully designed to be
slow and inefficient, delegations to agencies and ostensibly the
President are needed “to leverage up the lawmaking function of
government in order to generate the volume of regulations
necessary to carry out the wide-ranging functions of modern
government.”226 Related to this argument is one regarding
responsiveness. Again, because Congress is, by constitutional
design, slow and inefficient, delegation is necessary to allow law
and policymaking that is responsive to current conditions.227 As
the Court has explained, “[t]he legislative process would
frequently bog down if Congress were constitutionally required to
223

Sunstein, supra note 7, at 323.
Id.
225
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1746 (“If citizens have the capacity to
sanction politicians who make bad policy in statutes, they should also have the
capacity to sanction politicians who fail to punish agencies that make bad policy, or
who delegate authority to such agencies in the first place.”).
226
Merrill, supra note 49, at 2153.
227
Id. at 2154–55.
224
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appraise before-hand the myriad situations to which it wishes a
particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for
each situation.”228
While both of these arguments provide a cogent rationale for
allowing broad delegation, they are neutral with respect to
whether a delegation to the President should be viewed less
favorably than a delegation to an agency. Both agencies and the
President are nimbler than Congress and more able to respond to
current conditions. While arguably the President is somewhat
nimbler than an agency, given that he is a unitary figure rather
than a sprawling bureaucracy,229 the President’s actions pursuant
to a delegation would in many cases have to be informed by either
the expertise or fact-finding of an agency.230
Thus, these
justifications for congressional delegation tell us nothing about
whether delegations to the President should be less favored than
delegations to agencies.
The justifications of scale and responsiveness for delegation
certainly do not counsel against a stricter view of delegation to the
President. Requiring Congress to define ambiguous terms like
“national security” or to require the President’s decisions to be
based on fact-finding, rather than be informed by it, do not limit
the President’s ability to more quickly and responsively make
policies pursuant to congressional delegation. If anything, there
is an argument that if Congress provides more specific definitions
and intelligible principles, the President will be more able to take
quick and efficient action, as such action will be within a clearly
defined and narrow scope.
Another justification for broad delegation is expertise. Todd
Rakoff has argued that the desire to have “expert judgment on
economic and social problems” has been “the most important
legitimating theory” justifying the growth of the administrative

228

Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch has noted that when rulemaking is delegated to
a unitary official, it raises greater constitutional concerns, because it allows for
“frequent and shifting” policymaking “with fair notice sacrificed in the process.”
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
230
See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 402 (1928)
(noting that before the President reaches a conclusion as to whether tariffs ought to
be raised on certain products, the Tariff Commission must make an investigation, and
give notice and provide its findings to all interested parties); Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel,
Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1338–39 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (describing
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act as requiring the President’s actions to be
based on findings by the Secretary of Commerce).
229
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state.231 Underlying this theory is the idea that Congress, filled
with politicians and lawyers, does not always have the expert
knowledge—for example, the scientific knowledge—or the factual
evidence to promulgate relevant rules.232 If it is desirable to have
policy formulated by persons with expertise in the subject
matter,233 then allowing broad delegation to administrative
agencies makes sense, since such agencies usually have large
professional staffs, protected by civil service laws, who have
specialized training and extensive experience with specific
regulatory issues.234 Related to this concern is one that certain
decisions be made on the basis of expertise and evidence, rather
than politics—the idea that expertise be based on “knowledge,
rather than political choice.”235 Under this theory, an agency can
be the better decisionmaker in certain circumstances precisely
because it is not accountable to voters, and thus can make
decisions based on facts and expertise, rather than on a desire to
be reelected.236
This need for expertise as a justification for broad delegation
is not undermined by requiring congressional delegations to the
President to be more specific. Indeed, the President, as compared
to members of Congress, has no particular scientific or other
expertise nor is he shielded from politics or political accountability.
Instead, he faces more political accountability than agencies.
Thus, the expertise justification for broad delegation does not
apply to him.
Moreover, this desire for expertise actually provides further
justification for a nondelegation doctrine that requires more
specific intelligible principles when the delegation is to the
President.
Currently, the Court’s lax approach to the
nondelegation doctrine means that Congress need not require the
President’s decision-making to be based on any particular factual
findings by expert agencies.237 For example, Section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act contains no statutory requirement “that the
President’s actions match the Secretary’s report or

231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Rakoff, supra note 150, at 25.
See id.
See Merrill, supra note 49, at 2151–52.
Id.
Rakoff, supra note 150, at 25.
See id.
Id. at 23–24.
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recommendations.”238 Moreover, the President “is not bound in
any way by any recommendations made by the Secretary, and he
is not required to base his remedy on the report or the information
provided to the Secretary through any public hearing or
submission of public comments.”239 Nevertheless, based on the
Court’s current approach to the nondelegation doctrine, the
delegation in Section 232 is perfectly valid because it does contain
some intelligible principles.240 The lax nondelegation approach
thus provides no incentive for Congress to actually require the
President to use or rely on expertise in effectuating a delegation.
If one of the purposes of allowing delegation is to ensure expertbased, non-political decisions in certain circumstances, a more
searching application of the nondelegation doctrine to delegations
to the President can be a means to ensure that Congress does, in
fact, require reliance on such expertise when it delegates. Of
course, no such rigorous approach is necessary in reviewing
congressional delegations to an agency, because the agency will
necessarily have expertise and be politically shielded in its
decision-making.241
Separation of powers principles, practical concerns, and even
most of the justifications for delegation all weigh in favor of the
Court treating congressional delegations to the President in a
more rigorous manner than it treats delegations to executive and
independent agencies. But what should this more rigorous
nondelegation doctrine look like? A review of the Court’s
nondelegation cases with respect to congressional delegations to
the President provides some guiding principles.
VII. A FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE ROBUST NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE FOR PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATIONS
Before the demise of the nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme
Court considered several instances in which Congress had
238

Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States., 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1351 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2019) (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
239
Id.
240
Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976) (finding
that “Section 232(b) easily fulfills” the intelligible principle test because it establishes
preconditions to presidential action and requires the President to consider certain
factors in making decisions pursuant to the statute).
241
See Araiza, supra note 28, at 249 (“[A] focus on the congruence between the
delegation and the inherent authority and expertise of the delegee could help
immunize regulatory delegations of the type the modern federal government relies on
to accomplish progressive regulatory ends.”).
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delegated authority to the President. A close review of these cases
provides some principles that can help guide a more rigorous
approach to reviewing the constitutionality of congressional
delegations to the President.
In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, the Court decided that the
Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 did not contain an unconstitutional
delegation of Congress’s authority to the President.242 The Act
allowed the President to suspend the Act and to place duties on
sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides imported into the United
States when the President “shall be satisfied that the government
of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee,
tea, and hides . . . imposes duties or other exactions upon the
agricultural or other products of the United States” such that the
imposition, or lack thereof, of duties is no longer reciprocal.243 The
Court held that the delegation was constitutional because there
were several aspects of the Tariff Act that ensured that it did not
“in any real sense, invest the president with the power of
legislation.”244 First, the President had no discretion as to whether
to suspend duties; the Act gave him discretion only with respect to
the duration of the suspension.245 Once the President ascertained
the fact that another country had imposed reciprocally unequal
duties and exactions on a particular product, “it became his duty
to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension, as to that
count[r]y, which [C]ongress had determined should occur.”246 The
suspension, therefore, “was absolutely required when the
[P]resident ascertained the existence of a particular fact.”247
Notably, the facts that Congress required the President to
ascertain were also objective and cabined: the Statute required
him to examine the commercial regulations of countries producing
the relevant goods “and form a judgment as to whether they were
reciprocally equal” or not, in their effect upon American
products.248 The Court thus held that “[n]othing involving the
expediency or the just operation of such legislation was left to the
determination of the [P]resident.”249

242
243
244
245
246
247
248
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Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
Id. at 680.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Likewise, in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co v. United States, the
Court found the delegation of authority to the President in the
Tariff Act of September 21, 1922 constitutional because it
determined that the statute contained “intelligible principle[s] to
which the person or body . . . is directed to conform,” ensuring that
the “legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power.”250 The Tariff Act of September 21, 1922 provided:
[W]henever the President, upon investigation of the differences
in costs of production of articles . . . wholly or in part the growth
or product of the United States and of like or similar articles
wholly or in part the growth or product of competing foreign
countries, shall find it thereby shown that the duties prescribed
in this Act do not equalize said differences, and shall further find
it thereby shown that the said differences in costs of production
in the United States and the principal competing country . . . .
[H]e shall, by such investigation, ascertain said differences and
determine and proclaim the changes in classifications or
increases or decreases in any rate of duty provided in this Act
shown by said ascertained differences in such costs of production
necessary to equalize the same.251

The Tariff Act also provided that the President had to take into
account certain factors in ascertaining the differences in costs of
production, including the differences in conditions of production,
the differences between wholesale and prices of domestic and
foreign articles in the U.S. market, and advantages provided to
foreign companies by foreign governments.252 The investigations
required by the statute were delegated to the United States Tariff
Commission.253
The Court found that the power delegated to the President in
the Tariff Act was not the legislative power.254 Instead, Congress
had vested in the President the authority to “interpret[ ] a statute
and direct[ ] the details of its execution.”255 The Court held that
the Tariff Act did not invest the power of legislation in the
President for several reasons, similar to those set out in Marshall
Field. First, the Tariff Act was constitutional because “nothing
involving the expediency or just operation of such legislation was

250
251
252
253
254
255

276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 858, 942 (1922).
Id.
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 402.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 406.
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left to the determination of the President.”256 Second, the
delegation required the President to act once he ascertained
certain facts; he had no discretion to do otherwise.257 The
President had to act “upon a named contingency” and thus “[h]e
was the mere agent of the lawmaking department to ascertain and
declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take
effect.”258 Third, the delegation provided only a narrow range of
circumstances in which the President could act: he could raise
tariffs only when there was not reciprocity in the way other
countries treated U.S. imports.259 Moreover, according to the
Court, the finding of whether there was reciprocity would be based
on objectively verifiable facts that would have provided a finite
limit on when the President could increase duties.260 Finally, the
delegation only provided a narrow range of remedies the President
could impose: duties could be imposed only to “equalize
the . . . differences in costs of production in the United States and
the principal competing country” for the product at issue.261 And
even then, the increase could be no more than 50% of any existing
duties.262 Justice Gorsuch has described the delegation in this case
as follows: “The President’s fact-finding responsibility may have
required intricate calculations, but it could be argued that
Congress had made all the relevant policy decisions” such that it
left the President merely “the responsibility to find facts and fill
up details.”263
Of course, the provisions in the National Industrial Recovery
Act failed the test the Court elucidated in Marshall Field and J.W.
Hampton because they did not contain the same kinds of
circumscribing factors as the two tariff acts that had passed
muster. The “hot oil” provision in Panama Refining provided “no
policy,” established “no standard,” and “laid down no rule.”264
More specifically, the Court noted that the delegation was
unconstitutional because it provided “no definition of
256

Id. at 410.
See id.
258
Id. at 410–11.
259
Id. at 410.
260
Id. at 405, 410–11. Whether the finding of reciprocity was an entirely objective
undertaking may be questioned, but the point is that it has been important to the
Court, in ascertaining an intelligible principle, that statutes have required some level
of objective fact-finding to inform the President’s decision-making.
261
Id. at 401.
262
Id.
263
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
264
Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
257
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circumstances and conditions in which the transportation” of the
oil would be allowed or prohibited.265 The Court also found the
provision problematic because it did not require the President to
conduct, rely on, or elucidate any type of fact-finding.266 The Court
noted that the provision allowing the President to prohibit sale of
excess oil without requiring any fact-finding failed to ensure that
the President’s actions “have relation to facts and conditions to be
found and stated by the President in the appropriate exercise of
the delegated authority.”267 The problem with the statute, then,
was that it did not require the executive to “ascertain[ ] the
existence of [certain] facts to which legislation is directed . . . .”268
It also did not require the President “to fill up the details” “within
the framework of [a] policy which the Legislature has sufficiently
defined.”269
The Court’s issues with the provision it considered in
Schechter Poultry overlap with those it enunciated in Panama
Refining, but were also somewhat different. First, while the
problem in Panama Refining was that the relevant provision
contained no definitions, the delegation in Schechter Poultry was
problematic because it included a vague term, “fair competition,”
that was not clearly defined.270 Like the provision in Panama
Refining, the provision in Schechter Poultry was also concerning
from a constitutional standpoint because it did not require the
President to base his actions on any fact-finding.271 The Court
noted that the law allowed for the President to create
administrative agencies to assist him in his delegated duty, “but
the action or reports of such agencies, or of his other assistants—
their recommendations and findings in relation to the making of
codes—have no sanction beyond the will of the President, who may
accept, modify, or reject them as he pleases.”272 Unlike the
provisions in the tariff bills considered in Marshall Field and J.W.
Hampton, the delegations in the NIRA impermissibly delegated
legislative authority to the President because they did not require
the President to rely on any fact-finding to effectuate the
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Id.
Id. at 418, 431.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 426, 429 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)).
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531 (1935).
Id. at 530, 538.
Id. at 539.
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delegation nor did they require that his actions be tailored in any
way to fact-finding.273
Prior to the nondelegation doctrine falling into desuetude, the
Court clearly considered certain factors in deciding whether a
congressional delegation to the President contained intelligible
principles and thus did not impermissibly delegate legislative
authority to him. These factors, framed as questions, are:
• Does the delegation contain clearly defined terms that cabin
the President’s authority to act, ensure that his actions are
based on objective considerations, or ensure that the President
has no authority to decide the “expediency” or “just operation”
of the statute?274
• Does the delegation include criteria or factors that the
President must take into consideration to inform his decisionmaking?
• Does the delegation require fact-finding to support any actions
the President may take and does it require the President to
find certain facts prior to taking action?275 Does the delegation
require some type of nexus between the fact-finding and the
President’s actions?276
• Does the delegation provide a limited number of actions or
circumscribe the type of action that the President can take?

I believe that when it comes to discerning whether a
congressional delegation to the President has sufficient intelligible
principles to ensure that it does not violate separation of powers,
courts should be required to apply a heightened form of scrutiny
that considers and weighs all of these questions.

273

Id. at 541–42.
See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892).
275
Another way to put this is does the delegation require the President’s actions
to be “contingent on factfinding,” Roisman, supra note 202, at 839, rather than merely
informed by it. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410–11
(1928).
276
See Roisman, supra note 202, at 892–94. Requiring a nexus between factfinding and the President’s actions does not do all of the work of ensuring that the
President is actually engaging in honest, reasonable fact-finding. In other words,
there is a question of whether requiring fact-finding means much if there is no judicial
review to determine whether the decision-making that is based on the fact-finding is
arbitrary or capricious. While this is a reasonable question, I believe that at least
requiring there to be a tight relationship between presidential fact-finding and
presidential action in the first instance will go some way to cabining the President’s
power and will, as Justice Breyer has said, provide a “check against arbitrary
implementation” of the President’s authority. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 488–89 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For other ideas on regulating presidential
fact-finding, see generally Roisman, supra note 202, at 894–903.
274
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Such a test would also include a few other considerations.
First, it would ask whether the congressional delegation to the
President is in an area that is constitutionally committed to the
Executive, such as military affairs or foreign policy. In such
circumstances, it would be inappropriate to apply a stricter
intelligible principle test, since, in fact, a broad delegation would
be allowed.277 Second, the test I propose would also ask in the first
instance whether the statute containing the delegation provides
for judicial review of the delegation. If so, this alone may satisfy
the inquiry, as it cures the concerns the nondelegation doctrine is
meant to address, although separation of powers concerns would
still exist.278
I propose that if a congressional delegation to the President is
not in an area already constitutionally committed to his authority
and does not include a provision for judicial review of the
delegation, a court, in reviewing whether the delegation violates
the nondelegation doctrine, should consider all of the questions set
out above and ensure that the greater weight of them be satisfied
for the delegation to be considered constitutional. This analytical
framework, which requires courts to consider several factors, none
of which is dispositive and no total number of which is dispositive,
is similar to the one the Supreme Court uses in other areas of
constitutional law—for example, in its approach to the Necessary
and Proper Clause279 or to discerning whether a state action that
has a disparate impact based on race is motivated by animus.280

277
See supra Part III; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768–69 (1996)
(allowing for very broad delegation of authority to prescribe punishment for court
martial to the President because of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief).
Even some who call for a robust nondelegation doctrine that would apply to all
delegations and gut the administrative state admit that “Congress has broad license
to delegate rulemaking authority to the president in the area of foreign affairs . . . .”
Gordon, supra note 9, at 781–82, 816; see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that even under his more robust version
of the nondelegation doctrine, he would accept a congressional statute that confers
wide discretion to the executive in certain instances, because “no separation-of-powers
problem may arise if ‘the discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the
scope of executive power,’” such as in the realm of foreign affairs) (quoting David
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1223, 1260 (1985)).
278
See supra Part V.
279
See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010) (holding that the
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to enact a civil commitment
statute based on “five considerations, taken together”).
280
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–
268 (1977) (noting that “[t]he foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to be
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Thus, it is not an unusual framework or one that courts do not
have competence to apply.
Furthermore, it is similar to the approach that Justice
Gorsuch proposed in his dissent in Gundy: he suggested that the
intelligible principle test should be viewed as requiring the Court
to ask certain particular questions that would help answer
whether a delegation is constitutional.281 While his questions are
somewhat different from the ones I propose here, and the scope of
the application of my standard is of course much narrower than
his, a version of the nondelegation doctrine that requires the Court
to ask certain questions in applying the intelligible principle
standard has been accepted by at least three justices on the
Court.282
Moreover, the questions that I suggest be asked to determine
whether Congress has provided intelligible principles to guide
presidential decision-making can be thought of as requiring a
“heightened scrutiny” standard of review when it comes to
determining whether a congressional delegation to the President
is constitutional. Indeed, one way to understand this proposed test
requiring courts to take into account several additional questions
when applying the intelligible principle standard to congressional
delegations to the President is to see that it is based on principles
that are similar to the ones that underlie the Court’s substantive
due process and equal protection jurisprudence. In that context,
the Court has made clear that when legislation on its face does not
appear to be within a specific constitutional prohibition, the Court
will apply a rational basis test, but when legislation “appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,” it
will apply a higher form of scrutiny to such action.283

exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory
intent existed”).
281
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch
formulated the test as follows:
To determine whether a statute provides an intelligible principle, we must
ask: Does the statute assign to the executive only the responsibility to make
factual findings? Does it set forth the facts that the executive must consider
and the criteria against which to measure them? And most importantly, did
Congress, and not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgments? Only
then can we fairly say that a statute contains the kind of intelligible principle
the Constitution demands.
Id.
282
Id. at 2131, 2141.
283
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 152 n.4 (1938).
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The Court’s current lax approach to the intelligible principle
test can be said to be similar to the rational basis test.284 In
applying the lax intelligible principle standard, the Court will
merely look for evidence of some intelligible principle in the
statute.285 Similarly, when it applies the rational basis test, the
Court will merely look at whether the government has or can
enunciate any rational or legitimate purpose for the action it has
taken, without further scrutiny of the statute.286 Both standards
are highly deferential to the legislature287 and both standards have
meant that the Court has almost never found either standard to
have been violated.288 In the context of congressional delegations
to executive and independent agencies, as I argued above, such a
lax, deferential standard makes sense because such delegations do
not, on their face, raise separation of powers concerns, as they do
not involve a delegation to an “acting body” that “is one of the
named actors of the Constitution.”289 By contrast, congressional
delegations to the President do, on their face, raise special
separation of powers concerns, and thus, applying a version of the
intelligible principle standard that requires a more searching
inquiry into the scope and nature of the delegation makes sense.
Scholars have expressed concern that reinvigorating the
nondelegation doctrine to require more robust judicial
enforcement of it “would raise serious problems of judicial
284

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (“[T]his Court has held that a delegation is
constitutional so long as Congress has set out an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the
delegee’s exercise of authority. . . . Th[at] standard[ ], the Court has made clear, [is]
not demanding.”).
285
Id.
286
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)
(holding that a “law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to
be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
it.”).
287
See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (“[T]his Court has held that a delegation is
constitutional so long as Congress has set out an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the
delegee’s exercise of authority.”); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (“It is enough that there
is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
288
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 (6th ed. 2019) (“The Supreme Court generally has been
extremely deferential to the government when applying the rational basis test. [T]he
Court often has said that a law should be upheld if it is possible to conceive any
legitimate purpose for the law, even if it was not the government’s actual purpose.
The result is that it is rare for the Supreme Court to find that a law fails the rational
basis test.”).
289
Strauss, supra note 118, at 635.
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competence and would greatly magnify the role of the judiciary in
overseeing the operation of modern government.”290 This proposal
mitigates both concerns. First, it would not greatly magnify the
role of the judiciary in overseeing the operation of modern
government, because the more robust version of the doctrine would
only apply to congressional delegations to the President, not all
delegations to the administrative state. Indeed, all my proposed
test does is require courts to engage in a more searching inquiry
where the underlying concerns animating the nondelegation
doctrine are most prevalent—where Congress has specifically
delegated authority to the President. Second, my proposal merely
requires courts to take into account certain additional factors in
deciding whether a congressional delegation to the President
contains sufficient intelligible principles. Whether characterized
as a multifactor analysis or a heightened scrutiny test, the test I
propose is not so different from ones courts use often in other
constitutional contexts.
VIII. APPLICATION OF THE “HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY”
INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE TEST
To see how applying this “heightened scrutiny“ intelligible
principle test would work—and to show that it is workable—I will
end where I started, with Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962, that was considered in Algonquin and American Institute
for International Steel v. United States.291
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act provides that if the
Secretary of Commerce finds that “an article is being imported into
the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances
as to threaten to impair the national security,” the President can
“take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so
that . . . imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the
national security.”292 While the Act certainly has sufficient
intelligible principles to meet the current lax version of the

290

Sunstein, supra note 7, at 321.
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 806 F. App’x 982, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 550 (1976).
292
Tariff Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (1962). The
version of the Trade Expansion Act that the Court considered in Algonquin gave
authority to the Secretary of the Treasury rather than the Secretary of Commerce to
make findings. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 550.
291
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nondelegation doctrine,293 would it survive a heightened scrutiny
version of the intelligible principle test that takes into account the
questions enumerated above?
Under my proposed test, the first question is whether the
delegation is in an area where the Constitution gives the President
independent authority. Section 232 of the Act delegates authority
to the President to raise tariffs, an area of law where delegation to
the President is common, but not an area of law constitutionally
committed to the Executive. Indeed, the power to “collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises” and “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations” lays squarely at the feet of Congress.294 The
second question is whether Section 232 contains a provision for
judicial review; it does not.
Next, the delegation in Section 232(b) must be evaluated
pursuant to the four questions I set out in the previous section.
Section 232(b) directs the Secretary of Commerce, on the
application of any department or agency, the request of an
interested party, or on his own initiative, to undertake an
investigation to determine the effects of imports of a particular
article of commerce on the national security.295 Under Section
232(c), if the Secretary concludes that “an article is being imported
into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,”296
the President has ninety days to determine whether he concurs
with the conclusion. If he does concur that the national security
is threatened, the President may then “determine the nature and
duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President, must
be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so
that such imports will not threaten to impair the national
security.”297
The statute provides certain factors that the
President and the Secretary must take into consideration in
determining whether the national security is threatened,
including:
[D]omestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such
requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of the
human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies

293
294
295
296
297

Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 559.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. cl. 3.
19 U.S.C. § 1862(b).
Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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and services essential to the national defense, the requirements
of growth of such industries and such supplies and services
including the investment, exploration, and development
necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of goods in
terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as
those affect such industries and the capacity of the United States
to meet national security requirements.298

However, the statute also says that the Secretary and President
may take into account other “relevant factors” not enumerated,299
essentially requiring the President to take into account certain
specified factors but also allowing him to take into account any
other factors he deems relevant as well.
How does Section 232 fare when subjected to the questions in
the heightened scrutiny version of the intelligible principle test?
Does the delegation contain clearly defined terms that cabin the
President’s authority to act, ensure that his actions are based on
objective considerations, or ensure that the President has no
authority to decide the “expediency” or “just operation” of the
statute? I do not believe so because the delegation does not clearly
or narrowly define “national security.” While it does provide
criteria the Secretary and the President have to consider in
determining whether the national security is threatened,300 it does
not limit the inquiry to these criteria, and instead allows the
President to base the decision on whatever factors he determines
relevant. This means that the President may make his decision
about whether national security has been threatened based on
nebulous and even highly subjective factors, rather than based on
objectively identifiable facts. Thus, it can be said that Section 232
allows the President to determine the “expediency” of the statute.
Does the delegation require fact-finding to support any actions
the President may take and does it require the President to find
certain facts prior to taking action? In other words, does the
delegation require some type of nexus between the fact-finding
and the President’s actions? While the delegation does require
fact-finding, it does not require the President to base his decisionmaking on this fact-finding or for there to be any nexus between
the solution the President provides and any fact-finding. Thus,

298

Id. § 1862(d).
Id.
300
This is the second question in the analysis: Does the delegation include criteria
or factors that the President must consider prior to acting?
299
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whatever fact-finding is required does not cabin the President’s
decisions.
Does the delegation provide a limited number of actions or
circumscribe the type of action that the President can take? Here,
the answer is also in the negative. The delegation gives the
President very broad authority to address any national security
threat he finds. He is allowed to “determine the nature and
duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President, must
be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so
that such imports will not threaten to impair the national
security.”301 Thus, Section 232 provides no limit or guidance on
which types of import adjustments the President can impose. He
can increase existing tariffs by any amount, can impose unlimited
new tariffs on goods that have previously been determined to be
duty-free, and can impose quotas without limit, for whatever
duration of time he wants. Section 232, therefore, in no way
circumscribes the President’s ability to act pursuant to the statute.
Applying the factors that I believe should be considered under my
proposed heightened scrutiny version of the intelligible principle
standard, it becomes clear that the Section 232 threatens
separation of powers and should be considered unconstitutional.302
This exercise shows that applying this heightened scrutiny
version of the intelligible principle test is no more difficult or
judicially unmanageable than applying any other test the courts
have used to determine the constitutionality of legislation. The
only difficulty that this approach poses is it requires the Court to
wrestle with Algonquin and stare decisis.303 However, as set forth
above, I believe that the separation of powers concerns that are
raised by aggrandizements of presidential power are serious
301

§ 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
Given that the delegation is, under my proposed test, unconstitutional, the
remedy would be to merely strike the delegation provision, which is severable from
the rest of the statute, rather than striking down the entire statute. This is how the
Court dealt with the delegation provisions in the NIRA, striking down just the
provisions that they found invalid, rather than the entire NIRA. See, e.g., A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
303
The current Court has had a love-hate relationship with stare decisis. In the
past few terms, it has refused to abide by stare decisis and explicitly overruled its
previous holdings in several cases. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S.
Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019) (overruling Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)); Ramos v.
Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1402 (2020) (overruling Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 364–65 (1972)). It has also found stare
decisis to be particularly compelling in other cases. See, e.g., June Med. Servs., L.L.C.
v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (following Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)).
302
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enough that the Court should revisit not only Algonquin, but its
nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence as applied to congressional
delegations of power to the President.
CONCLUSION
In a piece advocating a different sort of limited reinvigoration
of the nondelegation doctrine, William Araiza has pointed to the
President’s use of the National Emergencies Act (NEA)304 as
raising serious concerns about Congress’s broad delegations of
authority to the President.305 He said, “the President’s use of the
NEA power, and analogous powers under other statutes, raises
serious questions whether Congress should—or should be
constitutionally compelled to—impose conditions on such openended delegations of power to bypass the legislative process and
make federal government policy on his own.”306 Indeed, Congress
has enacted a plethora of statutes with such open-ended
delegations of power. As an example, in 136 different statutes,
Congress has delegated emergency powers authority to the
President.307 While some of those delegations, including in the
NEA, are ostensibly in areas where the President has independent
power under the Constitution, such as over the military, many are
not. As the Brennan Center has noted, “[e]mergency powers cover
almost every imaginable subject area, including the military, land
use, public health, trade, federal pay schedules, agriculture,
transportation, communications, and criminal law.”308 In 123 of
the 136 statutes, the President may declare a “national
emergency” rather than Congress, and 96 of the statutes require
no nexus between any fact-finding and the President’s declaration:
they require nothing more than the President’s signature on the
emergency declaration.309
There is no doubt that, as the COVID-19 pandemic has made
clear, the President needs emergency powers to deal with real
issues that threaten the well-being of the nation.310 However, the
304

50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1976).
Araiza, supra note 28, at 246,
306
Id. .
307
Brennan Center for Justice, A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, 1, 3
(Sept.
14,
2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201910/2019_10_15_EmergencyPowersFULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PJW-CRVU].
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Id.
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Id.
310
Ironically, President Trump was loathe to use such powers to address the
COVID-19 outbreak. See Nathaniel Weixel, Frustration Mounts at Trump’s
305
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fact that presidents have increasingly relied on congressional
delegations of emergency powers when it is less clear that there is
a national emergency311 raises real concerns about the
aggrandizement of the presidency.
Thus, I agree with Professor Araiza that Congress should
impose more restrictive conditions on these open-ended
delegations of power. Unfortunately, Congress rarely acts to
preserve its own power or to deny authority to the other branches
of government.312 Thus, as Professor Araiza puts it, Congress must
be “constitutionally compelled” to act.313 A more robust application
of the nondelegation doctrine to congressional delegations to the
President can provide the impetus for Congress to cabin the
President’s authority.314
In sum, because of the President’s special place in the
constitutional structure, the threat of augmenting his power is
particularly acute, and frankly, today, more palpable. Of course,
as I have admitted, there are circumstances where it makes sense
for Congress to delegate authority to the President to act, usually
because a more nimble approach that takes into account current
circumstances is required. However, such delegations, if not
narrowly circumscribed, are subject to abuse. A more rigorous and
robust approach to the nondelegation doctrine that applies a form
of heightened scrutiny to the intelligible principle standard would
help ensure that congressional delegations to the President are
sufficiently circumscribed to prevent abuse, and ultimately,
tyranny.

Reluctance to Use Emergency Production Powers, THE HILL (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:55PM),
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